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I. INTRODUCTION
When I was asked to contribute to this special issue of the San Diego 
Law Review honoring Fred Zacharias, I knew immediately that I would 
write about ethics code drafting, a subject addressed by Professor
Zacharias in many of his writings.1  I had published an article in 2002
* Professor of Law and Nancy Barton Scholar, Boston University School of 
Law.  Thanks to Bruce Green and John Leubsdorf for reviewing and commenting on a
draft of this essay.
1. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, A Nouveau Realist’s View of Interjurisdictional 
Practice Rules, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 1037 (1995) [hereinafter Zacharias, A Nouveau
Realist’s View]; Fred C. Zacharias, Are Evidence-Related Ethics Provisions “Law”?, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1315 (2007); Fred C. Zacharias, Evidence Laws and Ethics Rules, 19 
PROF. LAW., no. 2, 2009 at 12; Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. 
REV. 335 (1994) [hereinafter Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics]; Fred C. Zacharias,
Foreword: The Quest for a Perfect Code, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 787 (1998); Fred C. 






    
 
  
   
   




    
  
   
  
  
   
 
 




    
 
  




entitled Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting in the Twenty-First Century, in 
which I reflected on my experience as Chief Reporter to the American
Bar Association’s (ABA) Commission on the Evaluation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct (Commission), better known as the Ethics 2000 
Commission or simply E2K.2  In reviewing both my 2002 article and
Professor Zacharias’s scholarship, I observed that Professor Zacharias
and I touched upon many of the same themes.  Nevertheless, I was
struck by the extent to which Professor Zacharias systematically
explored the various aspects and the complexity of modern ethics codes. 
The role of the E2K reporters was significantly constrained because 
the Commission had decided early on that, rather than drafting an
entirely new ethics code as the Wright Committee did with the 1969
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Kutak Commission did with 
the 1983 Model Rules, it would seek merely to amend the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct  (Model Rules) to bring them into the twenty-
first century.3  Nevertheless, because it was building on a solid 
Fred C. Zacharias, Integrity Ethics, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541 (2009); Fred C. 
Zacharias, Limits on Client Autonomy in Legal Ethics Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 199 
(2001); Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 169
(1997) [hereinafter Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles]; Fred C. Zacharias,
Should the Internet Make Us Reconsider Advertising Rules?, in  COURSEBOOK FOR THE 
31ST NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 199, 199–208 (2005); 
Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, 
and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223 (1993) [hereinafter
Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes]; Fred C. Zacharias, The 
Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False 
Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 829 (2002) [hereinafter
Zacharias, Future of Legal Ethics Regulation]; Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-
Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009) [hereinafter Zacharias, The Myth of Self-
Regulation]; Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 675 (2003) [hereinafter Zacharias, Purposes of Discipline]; Fred C. Zacharias,
Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 108 YALE L.J. 407 (1998); Fred C. Zacharias, What 
Direction Should Legal Advertising Regulation Take?, PROF. LAW., Symp. Issue, 2005 at 
45 [hereinafter Zacharias, What Direction Should Legal Advertising Regulation Take?];
Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody’s Watching: Legal Advertising as a
Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV. 971
(2002).  In addition, Professor Zacharias coauthored several articles with Professor 
Bruce Green on the topic of lawyer ethics code drafting.  See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & 
Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265
(2006); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of 
Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73 (2009). 
2. See Nancy J. Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting in the Twenty-First Century, 30 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 923 (2002) [hereinafter Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting]. More
recently, I addressed the drafting of lawyer ethics codes in an article on mens rea standards in
ethics codes, a topic that I first thought about in connection with my experience as Chief 
Reporter to the ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
See Nancy J. Moore, Mens Rea Standards in Lawyer Disciplinary Codes, 23 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2010). 
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foundation of existing rules, the Commission had an opportunity, as I 
described it in my 2002 article, to “reflect more deeply on the special
and evolving nature of lawyer ethics codes.”4  In particular, I identified 
and discussed three aspects of the broader picture that the Commission 
had addressed: (1) it considered, and rejected, a proposal to make the 
ethics code “more ‘ethical’—rather than strictly ‘legal’—by incorporating 
some form of ‘best practices’ or ‘professionalism’ concepts”;5 (2) it 
acknowledged that the role of the ethics code was broader than its 
narrow disciplinary function, expanding it to provide “greater guidance 
for lawyers, thus enhancing the likelihood of compliance with the Rules 
as professionalism norms”;6 and (3) it struggled “with the tension
between specificity and generality in rule drafting,” opting sometimes 
for specificity to provide clarity and notice and other times for
generality, to provide flexibility in addressing a variety of individual 
circumstances.7 
In this essay, I return to these three aspects of the special and evolving 
nature of lawyer ethics codes in order to acknowledge the important 
contributions of Professor Zacharias.  As I hope to show, Professor
Zacharias’s publications present a far more complex and nuanced view
of the task of drafting lawyer ethics codes than either the Commission or
I had contemplated.  Although there was not much time then to further 
address these more theoretical concerns, I am confident that we would 
have benefitted enormously from a deeper exploration of his scholarship 
in this area. 
II. THE ROLE OF “ETHICS” AND “PROFESSIONALISM” IN MODERN 
LAWYER DISCIPLINARY CODES 
Early in its deliberations, the Ethics 2000 Commission considered
“whether it would be possible to add some discussion of ‘better practice’
back into the Commentary to the Rules,”8 thereby implementing the
recommendation of a 1986 ABA report urging lawyers to abide by
higher standards than the minimum required by lawyer disciplinary
4. Id. at 929. 
5. Id. at 930 & n.47. 
6. Id. at 930. 
7. Id. at 931–32. 
8. Minutes, Comm’n on Evaluation of the Rules of Prof’l Conduct (Aug. 4, 





   
  










     














rules9 and responding to the concern of many lawyers to improve the 
public image of lawyers and recapture the pride of professionalism.10  In
particular, the Commission was considering a request to add 
aspirational—and thereby unenforceable—“Principles of Better
Practice” in the comments to the black-letter disciplinary rules.11 The
Commission concluded that “given the regulatory sophistication of the 
Model Rules, it was simply impossible to return to the exhortatory or
aspirational nature of the earlier [ethics] codes”12 because the use of 
exhortatory language would be perceived as inappropriate “preaching.”13 
In addition, the Commission was concerned that “any attempt to give
such guidance clearly would be misperceived as having a regulatory
dimension,”14 as had occurred when courts sometimes enforced the Ethical 
Considerations (ECs) of the 1969 Code of Professional Responsibility, 
which were also intended to serve as aspirational guidelines rather than
the basis for lawyer discipline.15 
With respect to the decision to reject the addition of “Principles of
Better Practice” to the disciplinary rules,16 I am satisfied not only that 
the Commission was correct, but also that the Commission rightly relied 
on the difficulty of introducing purely aspirational statements into a 
document designed primarily to serve as a basis for lawyer discipline.17 
Nevertheless, my review of Professor Zacharias’s scholarship has
persuaded me that the Commission may have failed to consider the 
9. See  AM. BAR ASS’N  COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, “. . . . IN THE SPIRIT OF 
PUBLIC SERVICE:” A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM
(1986). 
10. See Nancy J. Moore, The Usefulness of Ethical Codes, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 7, 11 (observing that these lawyers typically assume that “a lofty code of ethics is a 
central component of any true profession”). 
11. See Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting, supra note 2, at 930 & n.47. 
12. Id. at 930. 
13. Id. at 930 n.48 (citing AM. BAR ASS’N, CTR. PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT 
OF THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT xii
(2000)); see also Moore, supra note 10, at 7–10 (describing assorted codes that were
adopted at the state and local level following the ABA Commission on Professionalism 
report as “[o]ften ‘preachy’ in tone, their language recalls the ‘Victorian moralizing’ of 
the former ABA Canons—certainly not a useful model for the 1980’s” (footnote 
omitted)).
14. Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting, supra note 2, at 930 & n.49. 
15. See, e.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 59 (1986) (noting
that although most jurisdictions considered the ECs to be nonbinding, some jurisdictions
enforced them).
16. See Memorandum from Nancy Moore to Comm’n on Ethics 2000 (Oct. 3, 1997)
(on file with author), cited in Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting, supra note 2, at 930 
n.47. 
17. Even so, there may be aspirational statements in the current Model Rules.  See, 
e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 cmt. 10–11 (2010) (containing various
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extent to which the Model Rules can—and do—serve not only as a basis 
for lawyer discipline but also as a means of fostering ethical
decisionmaking and a sense of professionalism among lawyers. 
According to Professor Zacharias, in addition to providing the basis 
for lawyer discipline, lawyer ethics codes provide guidance for lawyers
in “choosing from among several [otherwise] permissible courses of 
conduct”18 because, “at least on occasion, lawyers do consult and rely 
upon professional codes for guidance even when the codes pose no
threat [of discipline].”19  In itself and read literally, this statement is
unremarkable and was certainly understood by the Commission when it
“proposed a number of changes designed primarily to give greater 
guidance for lawyers.”20 However, the Commission was primarily 
concerned with making it more likely that lawyers would conform their 
conduct to what was specifically required under the disciplinary rules, 
whereas Professor Zacharias meant something entirely different. 
As early as 1993, in an article entitled Specificity in Professional
Responsibility Codes, Professor Zacharias analyzed what he saw as a
“drift toward specificity” and argued that the “modern trend may go too
far.”21  In particular, he noted that “clear rules and punishment for 
violation of those rules are not always necessary to produce desirable 
conduct” because the purpose of some rules, even black-letter rules, is to
“promote introspection by lawyers—thought about what conduct is 
‘professional’ given the lawyer’s ‘role.’”22  The point here is twofold.
First, by refusing to direct lawyer conduct in a particular situation, code
drafters may be acknowledging that more than one response is 
appropriate; therefore, the code gives lawyers discretion to choose which 
course of conduct is best under the circumstances.23  Second, and more 
important, Professor Zacharias believed that encouraging or forcing
lawyers to think about what conduct is best can foster professionalism 
because it makes “the lawyer act for ethical or systemic reasons rather
than because of the coercive force of potential discipline.”24  And “[b]y 
forcing lawyers to think in ethical and systemic terms, the codes hope to 
18. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 1, at 
234. 
19. Id. at 236. 
20. Moore, Legal Ethics Code Drafting, supra note 2, at 930. 
21. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Ethics Codes, supra note 1, at 224. 
22. Id. at 236–37. 
23. See id. at 257–58. 




























   
 
    





promote an introspective process that carries over to situations the
drafters do not, and perhaps cannot, foresee.”25  This concept of 
deliberately promoting ethics and professionalism in a disciplinary code 
by using general rules to prompt moral introspection runs directly
counter to the trend, first noted with approval by Professor Geoffrey
Hazard, to draft rules as specifically and clearly as possible on the
assumption that lawyers are “entitled to legal rules that are not confounded
by appeals for moral regeneration.”26 
In both Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes and subsequent
articles, Professor Zacharias elaborated upon his initial insight.  For 
example, he explained that in choosing between different levels of
specificity or generality, regulators must be mindful that too highly 
generalized mandates may not promote introspection but rather may
make it possible for lawyers to “justify virtually any response to any
ethical dilemma.”27  As a result, it may be necessary, in commentary or 
otherwise, to provide criteria and prioritize the different interests at stake
when lawyers exercise the discretion given to them under the rule.28 
Subsequently, in an article entitled Permissive Rules of Professional
Conduct, coauthored with Professor Bruce Green, Professor Zacharias
addressed at length the complex nature of discretion in permissive ethics
rules.29  Professors Green and Zacharias differentiated among rules that
are the equivalent of no regulation at all—thus neither encouraging nor 
contemplating the exercise of discretion; rules that affirmatively defer to
lawyer choice—thus discouraging external regulators from exercising
any regulatory oversight; and rules that constitute “regulated discretion,” 
that is, “permissive rules [that] give lawyers ‘discretion,’ but only
25. Id. at 258–59. 
26. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Address, Legal Ethics: Legal Rules and Professional 
Aspirations, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 571, 574 (1981), quoted in Zacharias, Specificity in
Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 1, at 260 n.110. 
27. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 1, at 
263. 
28. See id.  To illustrate, he gives the example of prosecutors being required to
simply “do justice,” without much in the way of setting criteria and prioritizing different
views of justice, for example, convicting guilty defendants versus preserving defendants’ 
rights.  See id. at 248, 263.  With respect to this particular example, it should be noted 
that there is not, nor has there ever been, any disciplinary rule that requires prosecutors to
“do justice.”  Rather, as Professor Zacharias himself acknowledges, these “requirements”
derive from an aspirational ethical consideration under the 1969 Model Code and an 
unenforceable comment to the current Model Rules.  See id. at 248 & n.81 (citing MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY 
EC 7-13 (1969)).  It is indeed regrettable that the current comment does not give more
guidance to prosecutors, see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2010), but 
I would have thought an example based on a highly generalized black-letter rule would
have made the point better.
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‘discretion to exercise professional judgment.’”30  Presumably, rules 
constituting both affirmative deference and regulated discretion 
encourage lawyers to engage in moral introspection.  It is the latter,
however, that are more likely to be effective in achieving this goal. This 
is because they subject lawyers to criticism for “abusing their discretion,” 
and “the permission to choose among the options comes with [enforceable]
expectations.”31  Indeed, according to Professors Green and Zacharias, 
these rules hearken back to a more traditional form of regulation in 
which codes relied not so much on specific conduct rules but rather on 
the anticipation that lawyers would exercise “self-restraint, guided by
professional norms.”32  Moreover, regulated discretion rules may actually 
force lawyers to make reflective choices in individual cases by
prohibiting them from bargaining away their future ability to choose 
certain options that would harm client interests in favor of the interests 
of individuals intended to be protected by the rule.  For example, 
Professors Green and Zacharias argue that it would be improper for a
lawyer to argue at the outset of a representation that the lawyer would 
not, under any circumstances, disclose client wrongdoing as permitted 
by Model Rule 1.6(b).33 
Had the Commission reflected on Professor Zacharias’s view that
modern ethics codes promote ethics and professionalism by sometimes
encouraging, perhaps even forcing, moral introspection by lawyers, it is
unclear whether the Commission would have proposed any additional 
revisions to the Model Rules.  Nevertheless, the Commission probably 
would have provided a better explanation for its decision to reject the 
addition of a “better practices” section in the comments.  In other words,
rather than implying that ethics and professionalism are no longer 
appropriate aspects of a modern disciplinary code,34 the Commission 
could have explained that one way codes can and do foster ethics and
professionalism, in a different, arguably more effective manner, is
through the occasional use of black-letter rules that require lawyers to
exercise professional judgment. 
30. Green & Zacharias, supra note 1, at 278, 281 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT pmbl. para. 14 (2006)). 
31. Id. at 282. 
32. Id. at 283. 
33. See id. 284–85.  To my knowledge, there has been no judicial opinion or ethics
committee opinion addressing the question of whether such an agreement is in violation
of the rule. 
34. See supra notes 8–15 and accompanying text. 
341
  
















III. BEYOND THE NARROW DISCIPLINARY FUNCTION 
What Professor Zacharias identified as a “drift toward specificity”35 is
part of what I have elsewhere described as a broader trend in
professional codes to evolve from a simple set of ideals to a “‘second-
level’ code” that contains more stringent language, designed to be 
enforced, and finally to a “‘third-level,’ in which the standards for 
proper practice are so clearly laid out that ‘[w]hat is left is little more 
than a quasi-criminal code.’”36  Despite this trend, the Ethics 2000 
Commission refused to view the Model Rules as having only a narrow 
disciplinary function and proposed a series of changes designed
primarily to give greater guidance to lawyers.37  These changes included 
transforming and expanding the terminology section of the Model Rules, 
expanding the comments throughout the rules, giving more explanations 
and rationales for the black-letter rules, adding cross-references to other 
rules, and providing guidance on other applicable law.38  What the 
Commission did not consider, however, was the extent to which modern
lawyer disciplinary codes may serve a variety of functions beyond either 
discipline or education, as Professor Zacharias believed they do. 
Professor Zacharias first addressed this subject in his 1993 article on 
Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes.  Here, he argued that in 
order to decide what level of specificity to use in any particular rule, it is
important to identify the rule’s purpose because “failing to identify the
underlying code’s purposes and linking the specificity of reform to those 
purposes leads to poor drafting and a muddled debate.”39  Professor 
Zacharias then noted that some commentators, including Professor
Hazard, view lawyer codes as the equivalent of “legislation—legalized
in format and judicially enforced,” in which case the purpose of every 
rule is to provide “a control mechanism for lawyer behavior.”40 
According to Professor Zacharias, however, lawyer codes are similar
to typical legislation “only when they try both to fix specific behavior
and to anticipate at least some measure of discipline for violation of the 
rules.”41  As discussed above, one of the ways in which lawyer codes
differ from typical legislation is that they do not necessarily embrace
objective rules for behavior but rather permit lawyers to exercise
35. See supra text accompanying note 21. 
36. Moore, supra note 10, at 15 (quoting L.B. Cebik, Ethical Trilemmas, in 1 
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN ENGINEERING 17, 18 (Albert Flores ed., 2d ed. 1980)).
37. Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting, supra note 2, at 930. 
38. Id. at 930–31. 
39. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 1, at 
225. 
40. Id. at 225–26. 
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discretion in determining appropriate conduct.42  In doing so, part of a 
code’s function is “to explain the parameters of the system and attempt
to identify how, when, and why a lawyer should act differently than 
well-intentioned laypersons might act.”43 Other functions include giving
greater guidance to lawyers and “creat[ing] a fraternity, or ‘profession,’
in which the members perceive a norm in dealing with one another,” 
thereby facilitating the legal process by helping to “normalize and guide
lawyer behavior vis-a-vis others.”44 
These views were more fully developed in a 2003 article entitled The
Purposes of Lawyer Discipline.45  In this article, Professor Zacharias
examined the entire disciplinary process, including not only the
drafting—and adoption—of lawyer disciplinary codes but also the 
conduct of disciplinary prosecutors, reviewing courts, and bar organizations
engaged in a variety of regulatory activities, including offering assistance to
troubled lawyers.  Addressing ethics code drafters, Professor Zacharias 
reiterated his view that “[e]thics codes serve even more purposes than
disciplinary decisions” through rules that serve primarily as instruction 
or guidance for lawyers and rules that serve the “‘fraternal’ function,
attempting to order relationships among lawyers and the courts and to 
facilitate communication.”46  In addition, he argued that “[s]till other
rules are geared primarily toward maintaining the image of the bar,” 
citing, for example, lawyer advertising prohibitions, which according to 
him are designed, in part, “to avoid a perception that lawyers are seedy
businessmen, a perception that can interfere with the ability of lawyers 
to develop efficient relationships with their clients.”47 
42. See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text; see also Zacharias, Specificity 
in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 1, at 238 (“The professional codes . . . 
truly intend to avoid objective rules for behavior and seek to leave the determination of
appropriate conduct to individual lawyers’ own consciences.”). 
43. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 1, at 231. 
44. Id. at 231 & n.27. 
45. Zacharias, Purposes of Discipline, supra note 1. 
46. Id. at 730. 
47. Id. at 730–31 & n.210.  Many commentators would argue that provisions 
designed to “maintain the image of the bar” are instances of the bar acting to promote its
members’ economic or reputational self-interest and therefore have no legitimacy.  See, 
e.g., Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 
639, 645, 655, 686 (1981) (discussing how “the Rules are both underinclusive (in the
double sense of overlooking salient behavior and being unduly lax) and overinclusive” 
due to the fact that “the ABA is an elite organization concerned with protecting the interests 
of elite lawyers,” and ultimately concluding that they are only revised and rewritten “in a





   








   
    












     
 
    
 
 
Of even greater interest, however, is what Professor Zacharias
identified as the implications of focusing on the entire disciplinary
process for the general drafting or rulemaking process.  For example,
“regulatory agencies have multiple, sometimes inconsistent, priorities . . .
[and] some of these may conflict with or undermine the rulemakers’
goals.”48  If the rulemakers take into account the broader disciplinary
process, they may “consider more explicitly the enforceability of the rules,”
including “defining [their] policies,” “incorporat[ing] statements defining 
their own priorities within the rules themselves, or even incorporat[ing] 
suggestions regarding appropriate sanctions for particular situations.”49 
Or they might draft more “self-executing” rules, such as rules requiring 
written notification or consent.50  Finally, they may “recognize the need
for routine review of the rules, with a view to evaluating how the 
realities of enforcement have affected the rules’ impact.”51 
As part of this broader focus, Professor Zacharias also considered the 
sometimes contradictory goals of lawyer discipline—such as incapacitating
Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689, 689–92,
708 (1981) (questioning “whether the bar as a whole can rise above parochial concerns 
on issues that place its income or status at risk,” due to the fact that the “ABA formulates
and fulminates for its health,” but ultimately rejecting Professor Abel’s implication that 
the “precepts lack ‘instrumental’ significance”).  Professor Zacharias was realistic about 
bar motivations and was often severely critical of bar organizations, including their promotion
of some of the advertising rules.  See, e.g., Zacharias, What Direction Should Legal 
Advertising Regulation Take?, supra note 1, at 45, 45–48; see also Green & Zacharias,
supra note 1, at 312 (“Bar associations rarely advocate the adoption of rules on the 
express basis that the rules benefit lawyers (economically or psychologically) or the bar 
organization itself.  Yet there is little doubt that ethics codes traditionally have included
self-serving propositions.”).  Nevertheless, he accepted that much of the time the bar and
the courts act legitimately and in good faith pursuit of the public interest.  See, e.g., 
Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, supra note 1, at 1172 (“Some commentators 
have questioned the good faith of the personnel who draft the professional codes, but the 
consensus is that lawyer-regulators in other contexts—particularly judges and modern 
disciplinary prosecutors—implement their functions relatively objectively.” (footnote 
omitted)).  His views on the relationship between advertising and its effect on lawyer-
client relationships are an example of his willingness to give bar organizations credit for 
acting in good faith. 
48. Zacharias, Purposes of Discipline, supra note 1, at 731 (footnote omitted). 
49. Id.  The ABA has indeed published a separate document suggesting factors to
take into account in determining sanctioning for rule violations.  See  AM. BAR ASS’N, 
STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 25 (1991).  However, these standards
were not drafted by the same groups that drafted the substantive rules.
50. Zacharias, Purposes of Discipline, supra note 1, at 733.  It is not clear to me 
what is meant here by the term self-executing.  Certainly the requirement of a writing makes
the rule easier to enforce, but the rule must nevertheless be enforced by bar counsel. 
However, Professor Zacharias appears to have meant something entirely different, namely
that “[r]equiring written notifications from lawyers to clients regarding the consequences 
of conflicts . . . helps foster loyalty by forcing lawyers to address the issue with their
clients.”  Id.  If so, then I believe that the term self-executing is not helpful in conveying 
his intended meaning. 
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“miscreant lawyers”—and “other bar regulatory efforts,” such as
“lawyer assistance programs that emphasize rehabilitation.”52  Perhaps, 
he suggested, “what [the bar] does best is to assist lawyers and . . . what 
the public trusts least is its efforts to regulate lawyers.”53  If so, then 
perhaps the bar should defer more to “civil and criminal law, as well as 
outside regulation, to enforce rules against lawyer misbehavior.”54 
Although he acknowledged that it may be neither realistic nor desirable 
for the bar to abandon or even severely curtail the field of lawyer 
regulation, Professor Zacharias did suggest that “[a]s a practical matter,
bar regulators may in future years come to rely more heavily on extra-
code constraints and outside regulat[ion].”55 
The relationship between ethics codes and external law is a topic that
Professor Zacharias addressed on numerous occasions.  In 2002, in an 
article entitled The Future Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: 
Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics 
Regulation, Professor Zacharias noted inconsistencies “between the 
codes and other forms of lawyer regulation,” and observed that these 
inconsistencies “may suggest that existing standards are unrealistic.”56 
Indeed, he went further and argued that “[p]erhaps the greatest delusion 
of the modern codes is the notion that the professional rules are all-
encompassing,” whereas in truth, “codes play only a small (though 
significant) role in constraining lawyer misconduct.”57  He acknowledged 
that “[t]he bar has started to recognize this reality,” citing the 2000 
publication of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers as “an
express admission that the professional codes are but a small part of the
law that governs, guides, affects, and deters lawyers.”58  Nevertheless, he
52. Id. at 725. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 725–26.  Of course, as Professor Zacharias has acknowledged elsewhere,
external law already plays a large role in the regulation of lawyers, particularly court
disqualification decisions and malpractice lawsuits.  See Zacharias & Green, supra note 
1, at 73–77 (discussing conflicting and overlapping state court oversight of lawyers’
conduct in “rule-making, discipline, supervision of lawyers’ conduct in litigation, and the 
administration of equity and common law causes of action,” including malpractice and
breach of fiduciary duty lawsuits).  For a discussion of the extent to which the U.S.
Congress and other nonjudicial institutions are now regulating many aspects of lawyer 
conduct, see John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959 (2009). 
56. Zacharias, Future of Legal Ethics Regulation, supra note 1, at 831. 
57. Id. at 858. 




















   
 








concluded that what the Restatement did not do is address the normative
question of “how the codes and other law should relate and . . . make 
clear the purposes and limitations of each set of professional rules.”59 
In The Future of Legal Ethics Regulation, Professor Zacharias found it 
difficult to predict how regulators would consider the interaction of 
professional standards and other forms of regulation, but he did “envision 
that future codes will make more specific reference to other law.”60  Not 
surprisingly, the Ethics 2000 Commission took this step in proposing its 
2002 amendments to the Model Rules.  In fact, the adoption of the 
Restatement was one of the significant developments to which the 
Commission looked in order to bring the Model Rules into the twenty-
first century.61  For example, recognizing that the disciplinary rules are 
often used in other contexts, the Commission added language clearly
acknowledging that the Model Rules establish standards of conduct by
lawyers; therefore, a lawyer’s violation of a rule may be considered as
evidence of a breach of the applicable standard of conduct in civil
liability and other nondisciplinary proceedings.62  In addition, the
Commission added references to external law in the comments,
particularly when such law was more restrictive than that reflected in the 
disciplinary rules.63 
Alerting lawyers to the existence and potentially more onerous 
requirements of external law is an important function that lawyer ethics
codes can perform.  However, Professor Zacharias also observed that 
code provisions are often inserted in an effort to influence external 
lawmakers, typically courts.64  According to him, these efforts are most 
likely to succeed when they fill in “[g]aps in the prevailing law” and, in 
addition, when there is “reason to believe the bar’s response is
measured.”65 In my view, this description accurately characterizes the
Ethics 2000 Commission’s approach to its proposed rule on the 
screening of lateral lawyers.66  In crafting this rule, the Commission was 
59. Id. at 864.  For a well-known article suggesting a methodology for determining
the appropriate relationship among the various methods of regulating lawyers, see David 
B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992). 
60. Zacharias, Future of Legal Ethics Regulation, supra note 1, at 869. 
61. See Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting, supra note 2, at 935–41. 
62. Id. at 936; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 20 (2010)
(“[S]ince the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer’s violation of 
a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct.”). 
63. See Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting, supra note 2, at 936. 
64. See Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 1, 
at 274–78. 
65. Id. at 275–76. 
66. See Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting, supra note 2, at 937–38.  The rule 
proposed by the Commission was not adopted by the ABA House of Delegates.  See
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aware that some courts would consider whether and to what extent a
personally conflicted lawyer had been involved in a matter before 
agreeing that the lawyer could be screened.  Concerned, however, that a
“proposed ‘side-switching lawyer’ exception to the black-letter rule” 
could not realistically be enforced in a disciplinary proceeding, the 
Commission chose to state in the comment that “[l]awyers should be 
aware . . . that courts may impose more stringent obligations in ruling 
upon motions to disqualify a lawyer from pending litigation.”67 
Although not explicitly acknowledged, this was clearly one instance in
which “the proposed rules were being used not merely to reflect other 
law but rather to shape it.”68 
What may have been clear to the Commission, however, would not 
necessarily have been clear to others.  For example, in an article 
coauthored with Professor Bruce Green entitled Permissive Rules of
Professional Conduct, Professor Zacharias implied that if one of the
purposes of giving lawyers discretion is to actively discourage external
regulators from entering into the field, code drafters should say so
explicitly.69  After all, the practicing bar may assume that, by definition, 
all permissive rules reflect this position, but a careful review of the
entire spectrum of permissive rules indicates that this is not always the
case.70  Moreover, he cautioned that code drafters should not advance 
this position lightly because other lawmakers are unlikely to defer to the 
judgment of code drafters in the absence of a persuasive reason to do 
so.71 
Commentators other than Professor Zacharias, most notably Professor
Susan Koniak, have argued that code provisions are sometimes adopted 
Commission Report, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/e2k-summary_ 
2002.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).  A different screening rule was finally adopted by
the ABA in 2009.  See William Freivogel, A Short History of Conflicts of Interest. The
Future?, 20 PROF. LAW., no. 2, 2010 at 3, 6. 
67. Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting, supra note 2, at 938 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  In addition to applying more stringent standards, courts sometimes decline to
disqualify a law firm, even when the rules of professional conduct have been violated, 
for various institutional reasons, including the failure of the aggrieved client to raise the 
conflict in a timely fashion. See generally Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: 
The Judicial Role, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71 (1996) (examining the relationship between
disciplinary and disqualification standards). 
68. Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting, supra note 2, at 938. 
69. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 1, at 288–89. 
70. Id. at 289. 
71. See id. at 291. 
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in a more pernicious effort not merely to influence the direction of
external law but rather to defy it.72  Although Professor Zacharias agreed 
that, at times, the bar may be “driven by its self-interest or self-image,”73 
he did not concede that apparent inconsistencies necessarily reflect
contradictory visions of the same issues.74  Nevertheless, in a 2009 
article entitled The Myth of Self-Regulation, Professor Zacharias argued
that, if Professor Koniak is correct in her assessment of the purpose of
these provisions, “there are a variety of costs associated with professional 
rule making that challenges external law,” including providing
misinformation to lawyers, “undermin[ing] faith in the legitimacy of the
rules,” and “mak[ing] the rules less important [by] effectively 
confin[ing] their applicability to the narrow areas in which the codes 
alone govern.”75 
Decrying the bar’s insistence on viewing itself as fully self-regulating, 
Professor Zacharias urged that ethics codes are more properly viewed as
a form of “co-regulation” and that fully embracing that view will 
“enhance the efficiency of the codes.”76 For example, he suggested that 
code drafters determine whether unenforced rules merely parallel 
external law; if so, then “that might speak to elimination of the rule
absent an independent reason to keep it . . . [because] perpetuating 
unenforced provisions undermines their force and lawyers’ respect for 
the codes.”77  Moreover, “identifying the guidance provided by external 
law would inform the bar about when professional regulation is 
necessary to fill gaps.”78  “In short,” argued Professor Zacharias,
“perceiving the role of the professional codes unrealistically as a
regulatory regime that should operate in the place of external regulation 
can cause the bar to err in the rules it includes, the way it writes its rules, 
and the focus of its operations.”79  In other words, “meshing the codes
with external law can lead to a clearer regulatory regime and better
guidance for lawyers.”80 
72. See Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, supra note 1, at 1179 & n.138 
(citing Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389,
1391 (1992)). 
73. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 1, at 
274–75. 
74. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 
74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 57–60 (2005). 
75. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, supra note 1, at 1179–80. 
76. Id. at 1181. 
77. Id. at 1182. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 1183. 
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The Ethics 2000 Commission clearly recognized the existence of 
external law, and even in hindsight, I do not view it as acting in defiance 
of such law.81  Nevertheless, we might not have fully recognized the
extent to which we were acting as mere coregulators, and we certainly
did not undertake any comprehensive review of the relationship between
the disciplinary rules and external law.  It is doubtful whether there was 
either the time or the will to conduct such a review, but it would have 
been useful for the Commission to have more deliberately pondered the 
purposes of ethics codes beyond lawyer discipline and education. 
IV. THE TENSION BETWEEN SPECIFICITY AND GENERALITY 
There were several points at which the Commission struggled with the
tension between specificity and generality in rule drafting.  To a large 
extent, it continued the modern trend, identified by Professor Hazard,82 
toward specificity in lawyer disciplinary codes.  In a few instances,
however, the Commission opted for a more general regulatory approach
because the Commission was “less concerned with clarity and notice to
lawyers and more concerned with flexibility, recognizing that the terms 
of disciplinary rules are (and should be) increasingly subject to case-by-
case interpretation by ethics committees or courts, both in disciplinary 
and in other types of cases.”83  This, of course, is a variation on the
perennial choice between rules and standards.84 
81. However, one might well characterize the ABA House of Delegates as acting 
in defiance of external law when it refused to approve the E2K Commission’s
recommendation to amend the confidentiality rule to permit lawyers to disclose a client’s 
intent to perpetrate an economic crime or fraud when the lawyer’s services had been used. 
See Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: 
Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 450–51 (2002)
(summarizing the E2K proposal to amend Model Rule 1.6 with regard to economic
crimes and frauds and the rejection of this proposal by the ABA House of Delegates). 
The 2001 version of the Model Rules prohibited the lawyer from disclosing a client’s
economic crimes or frauds even when external law required such a disclosure in order
for the lawyer to avoid assisting the client in such illegal conduct. See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) (2001) (stating that a lawyer may not knowingly “fail to
disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a 
criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6” 
(emphasis added)). 
82. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
83. Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting, supra note 2, at 931–32 (footnote 
omitted).
84. See, e.g., Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra 

























   
    
 
  
In opting for more general rules in these cases, the Commission was
aware of Professor Zacharias’s view that ethics codes are different from 
typical legislation because they are rarely fleshed out in ethics
committee opinions or in judicial opinions.85  However, the Commission 
was more sanguine than Professor Zacharias that the details would be 
worked out over time because, as Professor Green has concluded, 
clarifying ethics opinions have become more prevalent and more 
accessible.86 Nevertheless, perhaps the Commission was too quick to
downplay this unique aspect of ethical codes.  After all, ethics opinions
often respond to the fact-specific inquiry of a particular lawyer, and it 
may be unclear when their conclusions can be generalized to the 
situations of other lawyers where the facts may differ in some respects.87 
Another problem is that ethics committee opinions are not usually
binding on courts, thereby further lessening their ability to guide 
lawyers. 
As was typical of his work,88 Professor Zacharias’s study of 
specificity versus generality in drafting ethics codes was highly
systematic.  Not surprisingly, he rejected the standard binary choice in
favor of a more complex “specificity continuum,” in which he 
recognized greater variation in the extent to which regulators intend code 
provisions to establish uniform conduct.89  Professor Zacharias identified 
versus standards is not necessarily applicable to lawyer ethics codes because “[t]he rules-
standard debate focuses upon the likely effect of particular laws in inducing agreed-
upon, desirable behavior,” whereas “some code provisions simply seek to influence
behavior—sometimes in an undefined direction—by shaping lawyer attitudes.”  Id. at 
240–41. 
85. Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting, supra note 2, at 932 n.62 (citing 
Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 1, at 237–38). 
86. Moore, Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting, supra note 2, at 932 n.62 (citing Bruce 
A. Green, Bar Association Ethics Committees: Are They Broken?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
731, 732 (2002); Nancy J. Moore, Restating the Law of Lawyer Conflicts, 10 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 541, 542 (1997) (noting “the ever-burgeoning number of ethics opinions 
and court decisions that interpret and apply the code provisions . . . in a wide variety of 
contexts”)).
87. This is also true of judicial opinions; however, common law judges are very
much aware of the fact that their decisions and opinions will be used to determine the
result in future cases and draft accordingly. Lawyers drafting ethics committee opinions 
may or may not have future cases in mind, and in some instances, these lawyers will be
drafting quickly in order to get advice to the inquiring lawyers in a timely fashion.
88. See, e.g., Zacharias, Purposes of Discipline, supra note 1, at 693–744 
(systemically analyzing four separate orientations toward discipline, the impact of these 
different orientations, and the consequences of acknowledging the various purposes of
discipline, including the ramifications for reviewing courts, rulemakers, disciplinary
prosecutors, and bar agencies); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Effects of Reputation on the 
Legal Profession, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173, 175, 176–83 (2008) (offering “a
taxonomy of the ways in which lawyers’ reputations are important”). 
89. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 1, at 
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four points along this spectrum, thus enabling a rule to be characterized 
as one that either (1) offers a mere “axiom” without suggesting any 
particular result; (2) suggests a “process,” with “factors to weigh”; 
(3) suggests a result; or (4) requires a result.90  According to Professor 
Zacharias, current codes “reflect a mix of these approaches,”91 which is
perfectly understandable given the variety of purposes of these codes.92 
Indeed, in his view, regulators need to recognize and draft with the 
specificity continuum in mind, considering both “how [proposed
provisions] interrelate with other provisions, and how a package of 
regulation at that level of specificity effectuates the codes’ goals.”93 
Professor Zacharias addressed an entirely different aspect of the 
tension between specificity and generality in his 1997 article entitled
Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles.94  The question he posed in this article 
is “whether lawyers in different categories of practice should assume 
different roles” and, if so, “whether ethics regulators and theorists should 
recognize finer distinctions among lawyers’ roles than they have relied 
upon thus far.”95  The article examined three ways of reconceptualizing 
legal ethics, each of which might entail drafting more specialized, that is,
specific, ethical rules.  The first focuses on the varied goals of legal
representations,96 while the second focuses on different types of clients
and the varying nature of the attorney-client relationship these clients
would require.97  Professor Zacharias concluded that both of “[t]hese
reconceptualizations have much to offer in a theoretical sense, but may
prove difficult to implement on a case-by-case or rule-by-rule basis.”98 
As Professor Zacharias accurately noted, other commentators have
proposed yet a third way of reconceptualizing legal ethics—according to 
different areas of practice.  If accepted, this could result in specialized
codes of conduct in areas like family law, estate law, and immigration 
practice.99  Professor Zacharias viewed this third way as more promising 
because of its practicality; however, rather than rely on an entirely “ad 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 246. 
92. See generally Zacharias, Purposes of Discipline, supra note 1. 
93. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 1, at 247. 
94. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, supra note 1. 
95. Id. at 170–71. 
96. Id. at 172–86. 
97. Id. at 186–90. 
98. Id. at 171. 






























hoc” process of picking specific areas of practice to regulate, he 
attempted to systemically identify different ways of categorizing these 
subject matter areas.100  For example, there are subject areas in which the
interests of third parties are implicated on a regular basis, such as
matrimonial and environmental law.101  Other subject areas involve
“[n]ontraditional [a]dversaries,” in which the parties will be continuing 
to interact in the future; these subject areas include not only matrimonial
law, but also elder law and the representation of joint clients in business
ventures.102  Finally, Professor Zacharias considered representations of 
clients with nontraditional mental states, representations that implicate 
special systemic interests, and representations involving predominantly
nonlegal work.103 
Reconceptualizing lawyer roles along these lines does not necessarily
entail the adoption of separate ethics codes for each unique area of
practice.  Rather, according to Professor Zacharias, alternative approaches 
to implementing these reconceptualizations include relying “on noncode, 
substantive law constraints (e.g., fiduciary, criminal, and malpractice
law) to guide lawyers with respect to specialized contexts,” rewriting 
“the universal code to include enough specific provisions to guide 
lawyer behavior in subspecialties,” and continuing “to rely on the 
universal code, but provide regulatory supplements or protocols . . . for 
practices in which deviation from the general norms is appropriate.”104 
In the end, Professor Zacharias preferred the adoption of either
supplemental protocols or entirely separate ethics codes.105  According 
to him, substantive law is unlikely to develop specific standards of
conduct, and revising universal codes to account for significant 
differences is likely to produce inconsistent rules that are so detailed that 
they more closely resemble statutes rather than standards for
professional conduct.106 
Given his belief that general rules serve both to prompt moral 
introspection and to create a “fraternity” or a sense of “profession,”107 it
100. Id. at 191. 
101. Id. at 191–92. 
102. Id. at 194–98. 
103. Id. at 198–203. 
104. Id. at 205.  For examples of some specialized codes that have already been
promulgated, see id. at 190 n.97, which cites specialized rules for immigration lawyers, 
lawyer mediators in family disputes, lawyers representing professional athletes, and lawyers 
practicing matrimonial law.
105. See id. at 205–07. 
106. Id. at 206.  The danger of looking at detailed codes as legislation rather than “a
standard for professional behavior” is that “[l]awyers may fail to recognize the need to
engage in moral analysis of issues that arise elsewhere or may fail to perceive principles
within the code that apply more generally.” Id.
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was surprising to me that Professor Zacharias did not put greater faith in 
the continuing evolution of universal codes to address these significant
variations in particular areas of practice.  Indeed, Professor Zacharias
more recently concluded that “the most dramatic delusion inherent in the 
modern professional codes . . . [is] that a single set of rules should apply 
equally to, and can adequately govern, all legal representation.”108  But 
perhaps he was right to emphasize the need for more specialized
regulation, not only with respect to unique subject areas but also with 
respect to the different forms of legal practice.  For example, he
recognized that “the traditional assumption of regulatory symmetry”
may explain the ABA’s vigorous opposition to recognizing
multidisciplinary practices (MDP), particularly the delivery of legal
services to “sophisticated multinational corporate clients [who] can
protect themselves from the risks of multidisciplinary representation.”109 
In addition, he was an early champion of the need to differentiate 
between lawyers who practice as individuals and those in large firm
practice,110 including the desirability of imposing discipline on law firm
entities in at least some cases.111 
It is unlikely that the Commission would have endorsed separate 
codes for lawyers practicing in different subject areas, although it might 
 108. Zacharias, Future of Legal Ethics Regulation, supra note 1, at 841 & n.59. 
109. Id. at 842–43.  According to Professor Zacharias, the proponents of MDPs 
were “large American law firms representing sophisticated global clients” that wanted 
“to respond to accounting firms’ ability to offer an array of legal and nonlegal services.” 
Id. at 842.  But others have viewed the large law firms as more opposed to MDPs than 
solos or small firms because of their fear of competing with the large accounting firms. 
See, e.g., Dave Foster, Comment, Get off my Turf! Attorneys Fight Accountants over 
Whether To Allow Multidisciplinary Practice, 31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1353, 1364–65
(2000). 
110. See Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, supra note 1, at 386 (“[T]he codes 
have yet to come to grips with the essential difference in ethical issues that arise in 
individual and law firm practice.”); see also Fred. C. Zacharias, The Restatement and
Confidentiality, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 73, 85 (1993) (“Would not the Restatement be an ideal 
place to introduce some recognition that the term lawyering is shorthand for a variety of 
professions? There are differences among law firm lawyers, corporate counsel, and solo 
practitioners.”).
111. See Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1371–73 (1995) (recommending law firm discipline not 
only because of the difficulty of identifying responsible individuals but also because it 
responds to institutional pressures on individual law firm members, prompts “entity
‘introspection,’” and encourages firms to institute internal mechanisms of control); see
also Zacharias, Future of Legal Ethics Regulation, supra note 1, at 866 (predicting that 













   
    
  
    
 
  












   
have approved of the issuance of specialty codes designed either to 
supplement the Model Rules or at least demonstrate how the universal 
rules would apply in different specialty areas.112  The Commission 
considered and rejected requests to impose law firm discipline,113 but
perhaps this issue deserved more attention and debate, along with the 
possibility of encouraging regulators to include fines among the 
sanctions available in the disciplinary process114—a reform that may 
have been required, as a practical matter, had law firm discipline been 
adopted.115  Indeed, law firm discipline is one of these issues currently 
being considered by the recently appointed ABA Ethics 20/20 
Commission, along with the possibility of embracing multidisciplinary 
practices and other alternative business structures for the delivery of
legal services.116  Professor Zacharias was prescient in raising and 
112. It should be noted that there are already individual rules within the universal 
code that are addressed to lawyers practicing in specialized areas. See, e.g., MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2010) (stating that a criminal defense lawyer 
may not refuse to offer evidence of defendant when the defense lawyer reasonably
believes but does not know the testimony is false); id. R. 3.8 (listing the special
responsibilities of prosecutors).
113. See Meeting Minutes, Comm’n on Evaluation of Rules of Prof’l Conduct pt. 
XV (Aug. 6–8, 1999) [hereinafter August 1999 Meeting Minutes], available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/080699mtg.html (rejecting proposal to impose law firm 
discipline); Meeting Minutes, Comm’n on Evaluation of Rules of Prof’l Conduct pt. VI 
(May 7–8, 1999) (requesting reporters to prepare draft recommendations). The minutes do 
not reflect the Commission’s reasons for rejecting law firm discipline; however, they do
reflect the sentiments of two disciplinary counsel observers that law firm discipline was 
unnecessary.  In addition, one Commission member voiced the concern “that law firm 
discipline seems to soften individual responsibility.”  August 1999 Meeting Minutes, 
supra. 
114. See, e.g., Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and Other Tales About the 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 77–80 (1998)
(arguing for the use of fines in conjunction with other disciplinary sanctions).  The
current ABA Standards for Imposing Sanctions does not list fines as one of the sanctions 
that may be imposed, and an earlier version actively discouraged their use. Id. at 77. 
115. Cf. id. at 79 & n.356 (discussing how “fines may prove to be an especially
effective sanction for [large law] firms,” and noting that “[m]ost objections to the use of
fines can be addressed by writing standards that require the use of fines in conjunction
with other sanctions, not in lieu of those sanctions”).  New York and New Jersey are the
only U.S. jurisdictions that have adopted law firm discipline, and neither jurisdiction
uses fines as a form of disciplinary sanction. See How Should We Regulate Large Law
Firms? Is a Law Firm Disciplinary Rule the Answer?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 203, 
203, 209 (2002) (transcript of panel discussion from symposium entitled Legal Ethics 
and Large Law Firms).  However, as of 2002, there had been only a few law firms that 
had been disciplined, and they were merely issued confidential letters of admonition.  Id.
at 204.  Thus, as a practical matter, fines may be the most effective form of discipline for 
law firms. See Levin, supra note 114, at 79. 
116. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Preliminary Issues Outline (Nov. 19, 
2009), available at www.abanet.org/ethics2020/outline.pdf.  This Commission was 
created in 2009 to review the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as the
overall U.S. system of lawyer regulation, in light of advances in technology and the 
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pressing these issues and others, including multijurisdictional practice117 
and the nationalization or federalization of U.S. lawyer regulation.118 
V. CONCLUSION
As should now be obvious, Professor Zacharias had much to say about
legal ethics code drafting.  In virtually every instance, his approach was
systematic, thorough, and exhaustive.119  Throughout his scholarship, he
was less concerned with the content of individual provisions than with
identifying and exploring the process by which such rules are crafted.120 
His goal was to help drafters write more coherent codes and to better 
focus the debates over future reforms.121  He urged drafters to articulate
and prioritize the varied and often conflicting purposes of lawyer 
disciplinary codes,122 to tailor the specificity or generality of each 
provision to better achieve its primary purpose,123 and to recognize and
embrace the limited role of ethics codes within the broader regulatory
regime, including various forms of external law that the bar often
vilifies.124 In the end, what I will remember most about Fred’s
scholarship is his ability to appreciate and demonstrate the complexity of
117. See, e.g., Zacharias, A Nouveau Realist’s View, supra note 1 (responding to 
symposium contributors’ proposals to address the problems lawyers face in 
interjurisdictional practice); Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, supra note 1, at 345
(proposing the federalization of legal ethics as the best means of implementing a uniform 
code of ethics, which is necessary because of the increasingly national character of the 
legal profession).  Professor Zacharias’s proposal for federalizing legal ethics was made 
in response to the increasingly multijurisdictional practice of law within the United
States.  More recently, the profession’s focus has been on the increasing globalization of
law practice.  See, e.g., ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, supra note 116 (describing the
creation of the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 to address issues arising as a result of 
globalization, as well as advances in technology).  In my own view, the nationalization
of U.S. ethics law may be necessary for U.S. lawyers to effectively negotiate with non-
U.S. lawyers in order to solve similar problems that arise when lawyers and law firms 
are engaged in international cross-border practice. 
118. See Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, supra note 1. 
119. See supra text accompanying notes 2–3, 88. 
120. See, e.g., Zacharias, Purposes of Discipline, supra note 1, at 734 (indicating
that the goal of the article was not to propose amendments to specific code provisions 
but rather “to highlight the relevance of identifying the purposes of discipline to optimal 
implementation of the rules”). 
121. See Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 1,
at 242. 
122. See Zacharias, Purposes of Discipline, supra note 1, at 730–33. 
123. See generally Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, 
supra note 1.











all aspects of lawyer regulation125 and the need to draft with the
appropriate nuance that is often lacking in current ethics codes.126  I wish
that the Ethics 2000 Commission had been able to fully debate the many
aspects of code drafting he explored in such great depth.  I am confident
that future legal ethics scholars will acknowledge and extend his 
valuable contributions to this field. 
125. This complexity includes the messiness of the real world in which codes 
operate—the different kinds and forms of law practice, the variety of actors involved in
construing and enforcing the codes, and the myriad of ways in which individual lawyers 
respond to both the codes themselves and to the threat of different types of enforcement. 
126. See, e.g., Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, supra note 1, at 386 (urging the 
“appropriate nuancing of professional rules to distinguish among contexts and types of
practice”).
356
